

SECRETDDI/ACIS
INCOMING

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STATE

ACTION: NONE INFO: CRE, NIO/WE, ODPH-H, ODPN-N, ODPS-S,
 OGI/DD/E, OGI/IIC/TR-2, OGI/ISI/WP, OOE/EI/PS, OOE/EI/SI, OOE/WE,
 OSA/PA/S, OSWR/TTC/S, PLANFAC-E (), RF, SOV/CS, SOV/CS/CA, SOV/CS/E/P,
 SOV/CS/S/M, SOV/CS/Y, SOV/EAC, SOV/PA/C, SOV/PA/F-4, SOV/SF, SOV/SFD,
 SOV/SFO, SOV/TFA, FILE, PPD, SE, SE/RR, A/DDI/SP, ASG/MP, CI-2, D/FBIS-2,
 D/OCR-3, D/OSWR, DC/OOE/EI, DDI/ACIS, EPS/EG-2, IAD/IC, NED/NTMB,
 NED/NWB, NICAG/ME, NIO/GPF, NIO/SP, NIO/USSR, NPIC/SSFD, DER, DIA/MS,
 OSWR/CIG, SAG/MEB, SAG/PPB, SAG/SEB-3, STD/MTH, STD/MTW, (36/W)

82 9419592

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PAGE 001

NC 9419592

TOR: 091930Z SEP 82

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FM USMISSION USNATO

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9147

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INFO RUEHDD/NATO COLLECTIVE

RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 6479

RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1279

RUDORRA/USNMR SHAPE BE

RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GER

RUCBSAA/CINCLANT NORFOLK VA

RHFRAAA/CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GER

RUFDAAA/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GER

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: NATO, PARM, INF

SUBJECT: INF: SEPTEMBER 8 SCG MEETING

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. BEGIN SUMMARY: SCG MEETING SEPTEMBER 8 SHOWED
 CONTINUED STRONG ALLIED SUPPORT FOR US ZERO-ZERO
 NEGOTIATING POSITION AND BOTH TRACKS OF DECEMBER
 1979 DOUBLE DECISION (WITH GREEK REP MAKING PRO
 FORMA STATEMENT OF OPPOSITION TO THE MODERNIZATION
 HALF OF THE '79 DECISION.) US BRIEFED ALLIES ON
 PROSPECTS FOR UPCOMING ROUND IN GENEVA, NEW
 SS-20 DEPLOYMENTS, STATUS OF PERSHING II AND GLCM
 PROGRAMS, GEOGRAPHIC ASPECTS OF THE SOVIET POSITION,
 CURRENT STATE OF US THINKING ON VERIFICATION, AND
 SOVIET EFFORTS TO LINK START AND INF. ALLIES
 EMPHASIZED NEED FOR ACTIVE AND HIGHLY VISIBLE
 ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS AS ESSENTIAL PART OF PUBLIC
 HANDLING OF INF. NEXT SCG MEETING WAS SET FOR
 OCTOBER 26. END SUMMARY.

State Dept. review completed

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SECRET

82 9419592 SSO

PAGE 002
TOR: 091930Z SEP 82

NC 9419592

OPENING DISCUSSION

3. SCG CHAIRMAN BURT OPENED SEPTEMBER 8 SCG BY NOTING THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUED CLOSE AND FREQUENT CONSULTATIONS AMONG THE ALLIES ON THE INF NEGOTIATIONS, PARTICULARLY AS WE NEARED THE SCHEDULED INF IOCS. HE COMMENTED BRIEFLY ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN START AND INF, AND THE NEXT INF ROUND IN GENEVA.

- -- ON START AND INF, BURT SAID THE SOVIETS HAVE STARTED TO DRAW SPECIFIC LINKAGES BETWEEN INF AND THE START NEGOTIATIONS, E.G., BY MAKING THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF DEEP REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC SYSTEMS CONDITIONAL ON WHAT AMOUNTS TO A FREEZE ON U.S. FORWARD BASED SYSTEMS. BURT SAID THE SOVIETS MAY BE TRYING TO CREATE THIS LINKAGE WITH AN EYE TOWARDS INFLUENCING WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION -- I.E., BY CREATING THE IMPRESSION THAT INF DEPLOYMENTS WILL PRECLUDE PROGRESS IN START AS WELL AS THE INF NEGOTIATIONS. THUS, THE ALLIES WILL HAVE TO BE PREPARED TO DEAL WITH SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO CLAIM THAT A FIRM POSITION IN ONE FORUM MAY BLOCK PROGRESS IN THE OTHER.

- -- ON THE COMING ROUND, THE U.S. SEES NO REASON TO MAKE ANY ADJUSTMENT IN ITS PRESENT POSITION. THE "ZERO/ZERO APPROACH" IS PUBLICLY APPEALING AND REPRESENTS A STRONG ARMS CONTROL POSITION. INDEED, SOVIET DEMARCHES IN A NUMBER OF ALLIED CAPITALS DURING AUGUST INDICATE THEY ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE STRENGTH OF THE U.S. POSITION.

- -- THE FALL SESSION IN GENEVA WILL BE SHAPED BY THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST TWO NEGOTIATING ROUNDS, IN WHICH:

- -- BOTH SIDES STAKED OUT THEIR CENTRAL POSITIONS, WITH THE US CALLING FOR A TOTAL BAN ON LRINF MISSILES AND THE SOVIETS SEEKING TO PRESERVE THEIR MONOPOLY IN THESE SYSTEMS:

- -- BOTH SIDES LAID OUT THEIR VIEWS ON THREE KEY "SECONDARY ISSUES;" WHETHER TO INCLUDE AIRCRAFT; WHETHER TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF UK AND FRENCH SYSTEMS; AND WHETHER LIMITS SHOULD BE GLOBAL OR REGIONAL IN SCOPE.

- -- WHILE SOME PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE ON "THIRD-LEVEL" AND PROCEDURAL ISSUES, THE EVIDENCE SUGGESTED LITTLE LIKELIHOOD OF SOVIET MOVEMENT ON KEY AND SECONDARY ISSUES. THUS, THE PROSPECTS FOR DRAMATIC BREAKTHROUGHS

EXDIS

MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
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WERE NOT GOOD. NEVERTHELESS, THE U.S. WILL WORK TO MAKE PROGRESS, NARROW DIFFERENCES AND PAVE THE WAY FOR EVENTUAL AGREEMENT, FOR INSTANCE, BY CONTINUING EFFORTS TO SEEK COMMON UNDERSTANDING ON DATA AND THE INF BALANCE.

- -- IN SUM, WE WILL BE ENTERING THE "TRENCH WARFARE"

SECRET

SECRET

82 9419592

SSO

PAGE 003

NC 9419592

TOR: 091930Z SEP 82

PHASE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THIS FALL. THIS MEANS THE ROLE OF PUBLIC POLICY WILL ASSUME EVEN GREATER IMPORTANCE. THE KEY TO ACHIEVING SOVIET MOVEMENT IN THE TALKS WILL BE CONVINCING THEM THAT THE WEST WILL PROCEED WITH INF DEPLOYMENTS IN THE ABSENCE OF A CONCRETE AGREEMENT IN GENEVA.

4. GERMAN, ITALIAN, UK, BELGIAN, CANADIAN, NORWEGIAN, DANISH, DUTCH, AND GREEK SCG REPS RESPONDED TO BURT'S REMARKS. ALL REAFFIRMED THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE ZERO/ZERO APPROACH AND (EXCEPT THE GREEK) FOR BOTH TRACKS OF THE 1979 NATO DECISION. MANY EXPRESSED PREOCCUPATION WITH DEVELOPING UNDERSTANDING BY WESTERN PUBLICS OF THE U.S. POSITION AND THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE SOVIET POSITION. ALL STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF CLOSE, FREQUENT AND HIGHLY VISIBLE ALLIED CONSULTATIONS.

5. FRG DISARMAMENT COMMISSIONER RUTH PRAISED BURT'S RECENT ARTICLE ON START FOR THE NATO REVIEW AND URGED THAT A SIMILAR ARTICLE BE PREPARED ON THE INF NEGOTIATIONS, DEALING WITH FOUR THEMES: WESTERN CONCERNS ABOUT SOVIET LRINF MISSILES; THE GEOGRAPHIC ISSUE; COUNTING RULES; AND THIRD-COUNTRY SYSTEMS. RUTH CONTINUED THAT WE CAN EXPECT GROWING DEBATE AND INCREASED POLEMICS, NOT ONLY FROM THE SOVIETS BUT FROM WESTERN EUROPEAN OPPONENTS OF INF MODERNIZATION. TO COMBAT THIS, WE WILL NEED WELL DEVELOPED PUBLIC THEMES AND MAXIMUM VISIBILITY FOR ALLIED CONSULTATIONS. RUTH SAID THE SOVIET POSITION IN START AIMS AT "DECOUPLING" THE INF QUESTION BY TURNING IT INTO A REGIONAL PROBLEM RATHER THAN ONE ASPECT OF THE OVERALL STRATEGIC SITUATION, AND BY WORKING TOWARD ESTABLISHMENT OF EUROPE AS A SPECIAL NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL ZONE. THUS, RUTH EMPHASIZED IT IS VITALLY IMPORTANT THAT THERE BE CLOSE AND VISIBLE ALLIED CONSULTATIONS ON START AS WELL AS INF.

6. UK SCG REP DAVID GILLMORE SAID THAT THE ZERO/ZERO OUTCOME REMAINS THE "CENTRAL POLE OF OUR POSITION WHICH WE SHOULD NOT LEAVE." GILLMORE SAID WE WERE IN SOME SENSES NEGOTIATING ON TWO FRONTS: THE EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA, AND THE "WEST/WEST" NEGOTIATIONS DEALING WITH PUBLIC OPINION. THUS, GILLMORE COMMENTED, HE SECONDED RUTH'S POINT ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF CLOSE ALLIED AWARENESS OF DEVELOPMENTS IN START AS WELL AS INF. REFERRING TO SOVIET EFFORTS TO DRAW LINKAGES BETWEEN START AND INF, GILLMORE NOTED THAT THE WEST ITSELF HAD LAUNCHED INF "IN THE SALT FRAMEWORK" AND THAT THE CONCEPTUAL BASIS FOR INF DEPLOYMENTS AND NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEEN DEVELOPED AS PART OF THE EFFORT TO MAINTAIN THE CREDIBILITY OF US EXTENDED DETERRENCE. THUS, HE FELT THAT THE WEST COULD "CAUTIOUSLY WELCOME" SOVIET EFFORTS TO LINK START AND INF, WHILE ENSURING THAT THE ISSUE WAS EXPLOITED AS THE WEST WOULD WANT, I.E., TO ENHANCE COUPLING, AND NOT AS THE SOVIETS WOULD WANT.

7. ITALIAN REP CORRADO TALIANI REAFFIRMED THE ZERO/ZERO APPROACH BUT CAUTIONED THAT WE NOT MAKE IT APPEAR THAT THE ZERO APPROACH IS A TAKE-IT-OR-LEAVE-IT POSITION. CITING THE PRESIDENT'S NOVEMBER 18 SPEECH, TALIANI NOTED THAT THE U.S. WOULD ENTERTAIN SERIOUS PROPOSALS FROM THE SOVIETS; HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT YET MADE A SERIOUS OFFER. WITH REFERENCE TO GILLMORE'S COMMENT, TALIANI SAID HE DID NOT WELCOME SOVIET EFFORTS TO LINK START AND INF. HE NOTED THAT THE WEST CAN EXPLOIT INCONSISTENCIES IN THE SOVIET APPROACH IN THE TWO FORA -- E.G., BY NOTING THAT THE

SECRET

SECRET

82 9419592

SSO

PAGE 004

NC 9419592

TOR: 091930Z SEP 82

EXDIS

MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
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SOVIETS HAVE ACCEPTED THE IDEA OF LIMITS ON NUMBERS
OF WARHEADS IN START, BUT NOT IN INF. TALIANI
CONCLUDED BY NOTING THE NEED TO DEMONSTRATE FLEXIBILITY
IN GENEVA AND SUGGESTED THAT CONFIDENCE-BUILDING
MEASURES MIGHT FILL THIS NEED.

8. BELGIAN SCG REP DE LA BARRE SECONDED EARLIER ALLIED
STATEMENTS AND STRESSED THE NEED FOR HIGH VISIBILITY
OF ALLIED CONSULTATIONS TO COUNTER SOVIET PROPAGANDA
THAT ALLIED GOVERNMENTS HAD ABDICATED TO THE US THE
MANAGEMENT OF AN ISSUE OF CRITICAL CONCERN TO WESTERN
EUROPE.

9. IN OTHER COMMENTS, THE CANADIAN REP SAID THE
SOVIET DIPLOMATS IN CANADA HAVE BECOME MORE ACTIVE
IN THEIR PROPAGANDA EFFORTS, AND HE CITED THE
IMPORTANCE OF HIGH-LEVEL DEMONSTRATIONS OF ALLIED
SOLIDARITY. NORWEGIAN REP REAFFIRMED THE DUAL-TRACK
DECISION AND SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT TO CONVEY TO THE
PUBLIC IN SIMPLE TERMS THAT THERE HAS BEEN SOME PROGRESS
IN GENEVA ALTHOUGH NO MAJOR MOVEMENT. THE DANISH
REP SAID THAT SINCE BOTH THE NEW CONSERVATIVE-LED
COALITION AND THE OUTGOING SOCIAL DEMOCRATS SUPPORT
THE 1979 DECISION, THE CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT IN DENMARK
IS NOT LIKELY TO RESULT IN ANY MODIFICATION OF DANISH
SUPPORT FOR THE 1979 DECISION. THE DUTCH REP SAID WE
MUST CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE ZERO/ZERO APPROACH, WHICH
IS THE BEST POSITION BOTH IN SUBSTANCE AND TACTICS.

STATUS OF PERSHING II AND GLCM PROGRAMS

10. DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RONALD LEHMAN
BRIEFED SCG ON FAILURE OF PERSHING II MISSILE IN ITS
INITIAL TEST FLIGHT JULY 22 AT CAPE CANAVERAL, NOTING
THAT THE CAUSE OF THE FAILURE HAS BEEN TRACED TO
A MANUFACTURING PROCEDURE AND DOES NOT REPRESENT
A BASIC DESIGN FLAW. THUS, WHILE THERE WILL BE SOME
DELAYS IN THE TEST PROGRAM, THE JULY 22 FAILURE WILL
NOT RESULT IN ANY DELAY IN THE INITIAL OPERATING
CAPABILITY (IOC) DATE FOR THE PERSHING II DEPLOYMENT
NEXT YEAR IN GERMANY. HE NOTED THAT, CONTRARY TO SOME
REPORTS, THE CONCURRENT DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION
EFFORTS HAD NOT BEEN A CAUSE OF DIFFICULTY; THE FULL
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM WAS BEING UNDERTAKEN. LEHMAN ALSO
NOTED THAT THE GLCM PROGRAM IS ON SCHEDULE TO MEET
THE PLANNED DEPLOYMENT IN EUROPE NEXT YEAR.

11. LEHMAN'S BRIEFING PROMPTED A NUMBER OF ALLIED
QUESTIONS ABOUT THE FLIGHT TIME OF THE PERSHING II.
BOTH THE ITALIAN AND GERMAN REPS NOTED THAT CRITICS
OF INF CHARGE THAT SHORT FLIGHT TIME OF PERSHING II TO
SOVIET UNION CREATES SITUATION IN WHICH SOVIETS
HAVE NO TIME TO REACT AND RESULTS IN PRESSURES FOR
"COMPUTERIZATION" OF WARFIGHTING WITHOUT REGARD TO
POLITICAL CONTROL. RUTH ADDED THAT THERE IS A
DISTURBING TENDENCY AMONG ANTI-NUCLEAR ELEMENTS TO
FOCUS ATTENTION ON WARFIGHTING, RATHER THAN WAR-
PREVENTION, POTENTIAL OF CURRENT NATO POLICIES. LEHMAN

SECRET

SECRET

82 9419592

SSO

PAGE 005

NC 9419592

TOR: 091930Z SEP 82

NOTED THAT P-II FLIGHT TIME AT MANPOWER RANGE IS 14 MINUTES VS. THE 5 TO 7 MINUTES CITED IN SOME PRESS REPORTS. BURT ADDED THAT THE ALLIES NEED TO STEM A DEVELOPING MYTHOLOGY THAT THE PERSHING II CREATES A NEW STRATEGIC SITUATION. HE NOTED THAT THE US AND ITS ALLIES HAVE LONG BEEN UNDER THE GUN FROM SOVIET MISSILES, INCLUDING SLBMS WHICH CAN REACH US TARGETS WITH VERY SHORT FLIGHT TIMES. MOREOVER, THE PERSHING II IS INCAPABLE OF STRIKING MOSCOW, AND THIS IS NOT A THREAT TO SOVIET COMMAND AND CONTROL AS IS ALLEGED, WHEREAS THE SS-20 CAN STRIKE TARGETS THROUGHOUT EUROPE. BURT ALSO STRESSED THE NEED TO MAKE CLEAR TO PUBLICS IN THIS REGARD THAT THE 1979 DECISION IS CONSISTENT WITH, AND NO CHANGE FROM, AGREED NATO STRATEGY, WHICH HAS ALWAYS BEEN BASED ON DETERRENCE.

EXDIS

MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

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BRIEFING ON SS-20 DEPLOYMENTS

12. PM DEPUTY DIRECTOR ROBERT DEAN BRIEFED ALLIES ON LATEST SOVIET SS-20 BASE COMPLETION, WHICH BRINGS THE TOTAL OF OPERATIONAL SS-20 LAUNCHERS TO 324. DEAN NOTED THAT THE NEWLY COMPLETED BASE, LOCATED IN THE WESTERN USSR, BRINGS TO THREE THE NUMBER OF SS-20 SITES TO BE COMPLETED SINCE BREZHNEV ANNOUNCED A MORATORIUM IN MID-MARCH. DEAN ALSO INFORMED SCG THAT WORK CONTINUES ON TWO MORE SITES, ONE IN THE WESTERN USSR, WHICH ARE EXPECTED TO BE COMPLETED BY THE END OF THE YEAR. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION FROM TALIANI, COHEN INDICATED THAT THE "324" FIGURE WAS A GLOBAL ONE; THAT THERE ARE 234 OPERATIONAL SS-20S OPPOSITE EUROPE OF WHICH 189 ARE WEST OF THE URALS. WHEN THE ONE SS-20 BASE WEST OF THE URALS IS COMPLETE THERE WILL BE 198 SS-20 LAUNCHERS WEST OF THE URALS.

13. BURT NOTED THAT SOVIETS WERE NOW INDICATING THAT THE BREZHNEV MORATORIUM STATEMENTS SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD TO APPLY ONLY TO NEW SS-20 BASE STARTS, AND THAT COMPLETION OF SITES ALREADY UNDER CONSTRUCTION HAD NOT BEEN COVERED. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM NL REP VOS, HE NOTED WE DID NOT WANT TO ENGAGE THE SOVIETS IN A SEMANTIC ARGUMENT, BUT IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE SOVIETS HAD GIVEN A PUBLIC IMPRESSION THAT THERE WOULD BE NO MORE SS-20S, AND THE FACT OF THEIR FURTHER DEPLOYMENTS SHOULD BE UNDERScoreD. FRG REP RUTH ADDED THAT WE SHOULD NOT LET THE DEBATE OVER THE MORATORIUM RESULT IN THE SENSE THAT A MORATORIUM, EVEN A REAL ONE, WOULD BE A GOOD DEAL FOR THE WEST.

GEOGRAPHIC PROVISIONS OF SOVIET POSITION; NEGOTIATING ISSUES

14. OBSERVATIONS ON GEOGRAPHIC PROVISIONS OF THE SOVIET DRAFT TREATY WERE PROVIDED BY COLONEL TOM MARSHALL (JCS). REFERRING TO A PAPER AND MAP CIRCULATED EARLIER BY THE U.S., MARSHALL NOTED THAT SOVIET STATEMENTS ABOUT GEO-

SECRET

SECRET

82 9419592

SSO

PAGE 006

NC 9419592

TOR: 091930Z SEP 82

GRAPHIC PROVISIONS HAD BEEN INCOMPLETE AND OCCASIONALLY CONTRADICTIONARY, FOR EXAMPLE, IN ESTABLISHING THE SOUTHERN BOUNDARY OF THEIR PROPOSED "ZONE OF REDUCTION AND LIMITATION." THE SOVIET "ZONE" WOULD CONTRAVENE NATO'S AGREED POSITION SEEKING GLOBAL LIMITS, EXACERBATE THE BASIC PROBLEM OF GEOGRAPHIC ASYMMETRY, AND HAMPER U.S. ABILITY TO PROTECT WESTERN INTERESTS ABROAD BY PRECLUDING TRANSIT OF THE "ZONE" BY DUAL CAPABLE AIRCRAFT, WHICH SOVIET PROPOSAL WOULD LIMIT.

15. TALIANI AND GILLMORE NOTED THE CONFUSION CREATED BY THE COMPLEX SOVIET PROVISIONS ESTABLISHING THE URALS AS THE EASTERN BOUNDARY OF THE "ZONE", YET ACCEPTING NEED TO WITHDRAW SS-20'S BEYOND 80 DEGREES EAST LONGITUDE. DOES THIS INDICATE THAT THE SOVIETS ARE TRYING TO MEET OUR CONCERNS ABOUT SS-20 RANGE WITHOUT ENDANGERING THEIR CSCE POSITION ON THE DEFINITION OF EUROPE, OR EXTENDING A WESTERN DROIT DE REGARD OVER SOVIET TERRITORY BEYOND 60 DEGREES EAST? TALIANI NOTED THE DATA DISCREPANCY CREATED BY THE SOVIET EFFORT TO DEFINE THE "ZONE OF REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS" AS BEING BOUNDED BY THE CREST OF THE URALS. TALIANI ALSO REQUESTED THAT THE U.S. MAP BE AMENDED TO ILLUSTRATE SS-20 RANGE FROM NOVOSIBERSK TO NATO EUROPE USING BOTH THE 4000 KM AND 5000 KM RANGE ESTIMATES. RUTH ASKED WHETHER THE SOVIETS CLAIMED TO HAVE MADE A MAJOR CONCESSION BY OFFERING THE 80 DEGREE LIMIT ON INF MISSILES.

16. MARSHALL AND AMBASSADOR GLITMAN REPLIED THAT THE SOVIET 80 DEGREE LINE REPRESENTED AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF LEGITIMATE WESTERN SECURITY INTERESTS, BUT NO MAJOR CONCESSION - MERELY A PARTIAL RECTIFICATION OF AN ABSURD

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OPENING POSITION. WE SHOULD NOT ALLOW THE SOVIETS TO CREATE AN IMPRESSION THAT THEY HAVE MET OUR CONCERNS, OR THAT ANYTHING LESS THAN GLOBAL LIMITS WILL DO SO. IN OFFERING THE 80 DEGREE LINE FOR MISSILES THE SOVIETS HAD IN EFFECT CONCEDED A NATO DROIT DE REGARD UP TO THAT LINE, THUS GOING BEYOND THE CSCE PARAMETERS. HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS COULD STILL TARGET EXTENSIVE AREAS OF NATO EUROPE FROM BEHIND THIS LINE, I.E. FROM NOVOSIBERSK, AND WE MUST CONTINUE TO PRESS THEM ON THIS POINT REGARDLESS OF THEIR CLAIM THAT THESE MISSILES ARE TARGETED ON THE FAR EAST.

17. IN RESPONSE TO TALIANI'S REMARKS, COHEN INDICATED THAT IF THE ZONE OF REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS IS BOUNDED BY THE CREST OF THE URALS, THERE WOULD ONLY BE 198 SS-20'S THAT WERE RELEVANT TO THE SOVIET PROPOSED CEILING OF 300 SYSTEMS. BY SO DEFINING THE EXTENT OF THE ZONE THE 45 SS-20 LAUNCHERS JUST EAST OF THE URALS ACCORDING TO THE SOVIET PROPOSAL WOULD HAVE TO BE MOVED BUT WOULD NOT COUNT UNDER THE 300 AGGREGATE CEILING. SOVIET OFFICIALS WHO, IN PRIVATE, HAVE INDICATED THAT "242" IS THE FIGURE OF MERIT FOR SS-20'S IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS, MAY BE LUMPING IN ONE NUMBER BOTH THOSE SS-20'S WHICH WOULD COUNT UNDER THE 300 CEILING AND THOSE WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE MOVED EAST OF THE 80 DEGREE EAST MERIDIAN.

SECRET

SECRET

82 9419592 SSD

PAGE 007
TOR: 091930Z SEP 82

NC 9419592

18. IN LIGHT OF FACT THAT SOVIET SS-20'S IN SOME SITES COULD REACH TURKEY BUT NOT CENTRAL EUROPE, TURKISH REP ILDEM VOICED TURKEY'S PARTICULAR CONCERN THAT THE SECURITY OF ALL ALLIES BE EQUALLY PROTECTED. BURT REITERATED OUR FIRM COMMITMENT TO THIS PRINCIPLE.

19. ON MORE GENERAL NEGOTIATING ISSUES, RUTH INTRODUCED SEVERAL QUESTIONS: (1) WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN ANY SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION OF DATA QUESTIONS; (2) WHETHER THE IMPACT OF THE 80 DEGREE LINE ON RELATIVE NUMBERS OF SOVIET AND US SYSTEMS UNDER CONSIDERATION HAD BEEN DISCUSSED; (3) WHETHER THERE WAS ANY SIGN THE SOVIETS RECOGNIZED REASONABLENESS OF US ARGUMENT THAT AIRCRAFT AND MISSILES CANNOT BE COUNTED TOGETHER; AND (4) WHETHER THE US HAD MADE THE ARGUMENT THAT NATO'S CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY WOULD BE UNDERMINED BY REDUCTIONS OF DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT REQUIRED BY THE SOVIET DRAFT TREATY.

20. GLITMAN RESPONDED THAT THE DATA EXPERTS GROUP WAS PROGRESSING WELL IN ITS AIM OF IDENTIFYING CONCRETE POINTS OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES AND (FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE) POINTING UP INCONSISTENCIES IN THE SOVIET POSITION. GLITMAN AND COHEN INDICATED THAT THE 80 DEGREE LINE HADN'T HELPED OUR POSITION MUCH ON DATA QUESTIONS, FIRST BECAUSE IT MAKES NO DIFFERENCE WITHIN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT ON WHICH WE BASE OUR ARGUMENTS, AND SECONDLY BECAUSE THE SOVIETS HAVE PROVIDED NO DISAGGREGATED FIGURES ON MISSILES. AS FOR ACCEPTING OUR DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN CAPABILITIES OF MISSILES AND AIRCRAFT, THE SOVIETS HAD BEEN CAREFUL NOT TO DO SO DIRECTLY, BUT HAD COME CLOSE TO DOING SO INDIRECTLY IN ARGUING AGAINST ANY US RIGHT TO SUBSTITUTE MISSILES FOR AIRCRAFT CURRENTLY DEPLOYED. THE US HAS MADE THE POINT FORCEFULLY WITH THE SOVIETS THAT WE COULD NOT ACCEPT THE DEGRADATION OF NATO'S CONVENTIONAL AIR CAPABILITIES IMPLICIT IN REDUCTIONS OF DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT NECESSARY UNDER THE SOVIET TREATY. BURT ADDED THAT WE COULD ARGUE HERE THAT SUCH A WEAKENING OF OUR CONVENTIONAL POSTURE WOULD ACTUALLY LOWER THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD.

VERIFICATION

21. BURT NOTED THAT THE US WAS ENGAGED IN A STUDY OF INF VERIFICATION. EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT US ANALYSIS WOULD BE FAR ENOUGH ADVANCED TO PERMIT THE US TO ADDRESS TOPIC IN THE NEXT ROUND, BURT CAUTIONED THAT A PRECISE

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VERIFICATION PACKAGE HAD NOT BEEN DEVELOPED, THE ISSUE IS HIGHLY COMPLEX, AND US THINKING MUST BE REGARDED AS TENTATIVE.

22. LUCAS FISCHER (ACDA) THEN PROVIDED A BRIEFING ON CONSIDERATIONS IN THE US STUDY. NOTING THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MONITORING, WHICH IS AN OBJECTIVE DATA COLLECTION EFFORT BY INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, AND VERIFICATION, WHICH

SECRET

SECRET

82 9419592

SSO

PAGE 008

NC 9419592

TOR: 091930Z SEP 82

INVOLVED MORE COMPLEX POLICY JUDGMENTS OF WHICH MONITORING IS ONLY ONE ELEMENT, HE EXPLAINED THAT THE US STUDY HAS SO FAR BEEN CONCERNED LARGELY WITH ASSESSING MONITORING TASKS. INF AND START ASPECTS OF THIS WORK WERE BEING CLOSELY COORDINATED. FISCHER OUTLINED THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS OF THE US STUDY: (1) MAJOR MONITORING TASKS; (2) US AND SOVIET VIEWS ON THE ROLE OF NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS (NTM); (3) POSSIBLE CHEATING SCENARIOS; (4) TYPES OF MEASURES UNDER CONSIDERATION BEYOND NTM; (5) CONSIDERATIONS FOR JUDGING VERIFICATION MEASURES; AND (6) SOVIET VIEWS ON VERIFICATION.

23. BELGIAN REP DE LA BARRE OPENED THE QUESTIONING BY INQUIRING ABOUT THE SOVIET RECORD IN COMPLYING WITH SALT AGREEMENTS. FISCHER ANSWERED THAT SOME ISSUES HAVE ARISEN DUE TO AMBIGUITIES IN THE TEXTS, BUT THESE HAVE GENERALLY BEEN RESOLVED IN THE SCG.

24. RUTH NOTED THAT INF, UNLIKE START, WILL HAVE TO FACE THE PROBLEM OF DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL SYSTEMS, AND ASKED ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR VERIFICATION ON THIS POINT. HE ALSO POINTED OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF ATTACKING THE SOVIET POSITION ON THE BASIS OF ITS VERIFIABILITY, PARTICULARLY THE PROBLEM OF DISTINGUISHING NUCLEAR-CAPABLE FROM STRICTLY CONVENTIONAL AIRCRAFT. FISCHER ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE WHOLE ISSUE OF THE NUCLEAR/CONVENTIONAL DISTINCTION WAS TOUGH. SEVERAL APPROACHES TO IT WERE BEING CONSIDERED, INCLUDING TYPE RULES, BUT NO SPECIFIC DECISIONS HAD BEEN MADE THUS FAR.

25. GILLMORE INQUIRED ABOUT US IDEAS FOR VERIFYING THE EXISTENCE OF CRUISE MISSILES WITHIN A CERTAIN RANGE CAPABILITY, I.E., 925-5500 KM. REFERRING TO THE NEED TO CONSIDER RECIPROCAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE US AND ITS ALLIES OF ANY VERIFICATION MEASURES PROPOSED, GILLMORE ALSO ASKED IF ANY CASES HAD YET EMERGED WHERE SUCH CONSIDERATIONS MIGHT INHIBIT THE US FROM MAKING CERTAIN PROPOSALS. FISCHER REPLIED THAT THE CRUISE MISSILE PROBLEM WAS ANOTHER DIFFICULT ONE, AND HERE TOO NO FIRM DECISIONS HAD BEEN REACHED. APPROACHES UNDER CONSIDERATION INCLUDED RESTRICTIONS ON MISSILE DESIGN, AND TYPE RULES. AS TO RECIPROCAL IMPLICATIONS OF MEASURES, HE NOTED THAT THERE COULD BE LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS IN SOME INSTANCES, AS WELL AS SECURITY CONCERNS.

26. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION BY VOS ABOUT VERIFICATION OF ALTERNATIVES TO THE ZERO/ZERO SOLUTION, FISCHER NOTED THAT THE US IS STUDYING VERIFICATION STRICTLY ON THE BASIS OF THE US DRAFT TREATY. BURT ADDED THAT THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT POINT TO BE MADE HERE THAT AS DIFFICULT AS THE VERIFICATION PROBLEM IS NOW, IT WOULD BE STILL MORE COMPLEX ON ANY BASIS OTHER THAN ZERO/ZERO. TALIANI NOTED IN THIS CONNECTION THAT THE COLLATERAL CONSTRAINTS IN THE US TREATY DRAFT NEVERTHELESS DO PROVIDE FOR LEVELS ABOVE ZERO ON SHORTER-RANGE SYSTEMS, AND THAT START VERIFICATION WOULD ALSO BE DEALING WITH LEVELS ABOVE ZERO. FISCHER ACKNOWLEDGED THESE POINTS, BUT REPLIED THAT INF VERIFICATION IS NOT FOCUSING ON LEVELS ABOVE ZERO OTHER THAN IN THE LIMITED CONTEXT OF SRINF CONSTRAINTS.

27. CANADIAN REP MATHEWSON ASKED HOW THE US WOULD GO ABOUT INTRODUCING THE VERIFICATION ISSUE IN THE NEXT ROUND; I.E., THE LIKELY FORMAT TO BE USED. BURT REPLIED THAT THE US GOAL IDEALLY WOULD BE TO TABLE A COMPREHENSIVE VERIFICATION ANNEX TO A TREATY DRAFT,

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SECRET

82 9419592 SSO

PAGE 009
TOR: 091930Z SEP 82

NC 9419592

MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

GENEVA FOR USINF AND USSTART; USNMR SHAPE. ALSO FOR
INTAFF

SHAPE AND NAPLES FOR INTAFF

VAIHINGEN, NORFOLK, RAMSTEIN AND HEIDELBURG FOR POLAD

BUT THE ABILITY TO DO SO WOULD DEPEND ON HOW THE
PRESENT WORK PROGRESSES. BURT NOTED THAT THE US WOULD
CONSULT WITH THE ALLIES FURTHER BEFORE ADDRESSING THE
QUESTION IN GENEVA.

PUBLIC HANDLING

28. BURT HIGHLIGHTED THREE MATTERS WHICH NEED ATTENTION:

- -- FIRST, WE NEED TO CONVEY TO PUBLICS AND THE
- SOVIETS THE AUTOMATICITY OF NATO INF MODERNIZATION
- IN THE ABSENCE OF A CONCRETE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT;
- THIS IS THE ONLY BASIS ON WHICH THE SOVIETS CAN
- BE BROUGHT TO NEGOTIATE.
- -- SECOND, THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE SOVIETS WILL
- EXPLOIT COMPLETION OF THE LAST TWO SS-20 SITES
- NOW UNDER CONSTRUCTION TO PROCLAIM A FREEZE ON
- FURTHER SS-20 DEPLOYMENT, WITH MORE CREDIBILITY
- THAN IN THE PAST.
- -- THIRD, WE MUST CONSIDER HOW TO RESPOND TO POS-
- SIBLE PUBLIC LINKAGES THE SOVIETS MAY DRAW BETWEEN
- INF AND START. WHILE THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE BY
- THEIR NATURE RELATED, PROGRESS IN ONE NEGOTIATION
- IS NOT DIRECTLY DEPENDENT ON PROGRESS IN THE OTHER.
- WE MIGHT EVEN REVERSE THE PLOY, ARGUING THAT IT IS
- THE SOVIETS WHO ARE MAKING PROGRESS IN THE INF
- NEGOTIATIONS DIFFICULT AND THEREBY TRYING TO
- IMPEDE PROGRESS IN START AS WELL.

- IN ADDITION, BURT OUTLINED STEPS THE U.S. WAS
TAKING ON HANDLING THE NUCLEAR FREEZE MOVEMENT IN THE
U.S.

29. UK REP GILLMORE SUGGESTED THAT THE WEST PRE-EMPT
ANY SOVIET ATTEMPT TO EXPLOIT COMPLETION OF THEIR SS-20
BASES BY DISCLOSING IN ADVANCE "WITH AN AIR OF TIRED
RESIGNATION" THAT WE EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO ANNOUNCE A
FREEZE ON SS-20'S WHEN THEY COMPLETE CONSTRUCTION LATER
THIS YEAR. GILLMORE ALSO URGED THAT WE RESPOND TO SOVIET
PROPAGANDA AIMED AT THE WESTERN ANTI-NUCLEAR LOBBY BY
EMPHASIZING FOUR POINTS:

- -- THE NATO POSITION CALLS FOR ELIMINATION OF AN
- ENTIRE CLASS OF WEAPONS;
- -- INCLUSION IN INF OF SUCH ISSUES AS UK AND FRENCH
- SYSTEMS OR U.S. AIRCRAFT WOULD HOPELESSLY COMPLICATE
- THE NEGOTIATIONS;
- -- THE WEST HAS EXPRESSED ITS WILLINGNESS TO FOREGO
- INF DEPLOYMENTS; THE DECISION WHETHER OR NOT THE
- DEPLOYMENTS TAKE PLACE RESTS ENTIRELY WITH THE
- SOVIETS;
- -- UNLIKE THE SOVIETS, THE WEST HAS NOT IMPOSED
- CONDITIONALITY ON INF AND START.

SECRET

SECRET

82 9419592 SSO

PAGE 010
TOR: 091930Z SEP 82

NC 9419592

30. BELGIAN REP DE LA BARRE COMMENTED THAT THE WEST SHOULD CONTINUE DEFENDING ITS PHASED APPROACH AND SHOULD NOTE THAT "NOTHING IS EXCLUDED FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS". HE ALSO REQUESTED THAT THE U.S. PROVIDE A PAPER TO COUNTER ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF A EUROPEAN NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE, AN IDEA WITH POTENTIAL APPEAL TO ANTI-NUCLEAR SENTIMENTS IN EUROPE. FINALLY, DE LA BARRE SUGGESTED US TRY TO IMPRESS ON MEDIA THAT RECESSES IN INF NEGOTIATIONS ARE NORMAL, REGULAR, AND AGREED TO ON BOTH SIDES.

31. NORWEGIAN REP MEVIK SAID THE WEST MUST DO BETTER AT STRESSING ITS OBJECTIVES IN THE INF NEGOTIATIONS. HE COMMENTED THAT THE RECENT ARTICLE BY SOVIET DEFENSE MINISTER USTINOV LED THE NORWEGIANS TO CONCLUDE THAT

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THE SOVIETS ARE NOT LIKELY TO CHANGE THEIR NEGOTIATING POSTURE ANY TIME SOON - WHILE HOPING THAT WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION WILL FORCE AT LEAST A DELAY IN INF DEPLOYMENTS. HE NOTED THAT ALLIED GOVERNMENTS SHOULD BEGIN EDUCATING PUBLICS THAT PAST SOVIET NEGOTIATING PRACTICE INDICATES THAT ANY SOVIET CONCESSIONS WOULD COME ONLY AT THE ELEVENTH HOUR, IF AT ALL.

32. FRG REP RUTH SAID HE THOUGHT THE SOVIETS WERE MORE LIKELY TO LAUNCH A NEW INITIATIVE ON AN SS-20 FREEZE NEXT YEAR, RATHER THAN THIS YEAR, PERHAPS COMBINING IT WITH SOME UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL OF SS-4'S AND -5'S. RUTH RECOMMENDED AN EFFORT TO REVIEW AND PREPARE FOR VARIOUS POSSIBLE SOVIET PROPAGANDA OPTIONS. WE MUST ALSO ENLIGHTEN OUR PUBLICS WITH AS MUCH CLEAR, FACTUAL INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE ABOUT NATO POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES, INCLUDING OUR CONCERNS ABOUT THE SS-20, SUPPORTING OUR POINTS WITH DATA WHERE POSSIBLE. PHOTOGRAPHS WOULD BE ESPECIALLY HELPFUL. PUBLICS MUST BE BROUGHT TO UNDERSTAND THAT INF NEGOTIATIONS HAVE ALREADY CONTRIBUTED TO STABILITY, HAVING CLOSED A CRITICAL GAP IN THE SPECTRUM OF ARMS CONTROL BETWEEN CSCE, MBFR, AND SALT/START AND HAVING ALREADY BROUGHT THE SOVIETS TO ACCEPT SOME PRINCIPLES FUNDAMENTAL TO SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS IN THE INF AREA. PUBLICS MUST BE PERSUADED THAT THE US IS NEGOTIATING IN HARMONY WITH SHARED NATO GOALS, AND IS SINCERELY SEEKING STABILITY AT THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL OF ARMS.

33. ITALIAN REP TALIANI DIFFERED WITH OTHERS ON THE POTENTIAL THREAT OF A NEW SOVIET MORATORIUM INITIATIVE, CHARACTERIZING THE MORATORIUM AS A "SPENT CARTRIDGE", HAVING BEEN FIRED ON SO MANY OCCASIONS ALREADY. INSTEAD, TALIANI SAID, THE SOVIETS MIGHT WELL LIFT THE "MORATORIUM" IN RESPONSE TO NATO DEPLOYMENT PREPARATIONS.

34. DUTCH REP VOS CAUTIONED THAT PUBLIC HANDLING OF ANY SOVIET PROPAGANDA ON THE START/INF RELATIONSHIP SHOULD NOT DE-EMPHASIZE THE START/INF RELATIONSHIP. HE ADDED A SOMEWHAT PRO-FORMA DISCLAIMER THAT HE COULD NOT SUBSCRIBE TO THE CONCEPT OF THE AUTOMATICITY OF INF DEPLOYMENTS, GIVEN THE RESERVED POSITION OF THE GON.

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SECRET

82 9419592 SSO

PAGE 011
TDR: 091930Z SEP 82

NC 9419592

FOLLOW-UP

35. IT WAS AGREED TO HOLD THE NEXT SCG MEETING
OCTOBER 26. BENNETT

END OF MESSAGE

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